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MUSIC COPYRIGHTS: THE NEED FOR AN
APPROPRIATE FAIR USE ANALYSIS IN DIGITAL
SAMPLING INFRINGEMENT SUITS
A. DEAN JOHNSON*
1. INTRODUCTION
D IGITAL sampling has become both the music industry's boon
and bane. Its introduction into the consumer market was hailed
as a great technological advance for the music industry,' as well as an
insidious conspiracy against musicians. 2 Copyright owners and studio
musicians assert that digital sampling denies them just compensation
for the use of their work. 3 Artists who use samples, however, believe
this fertile source of musical inspiration will become prohibitively ex-
pensive if they must license each use of previously recorded music. 4 In
* This Comment was awarded second prize in the 1993 Florida State University Nathan
Burkan Memorial Competition sponsored by the American Society of Composers, Authors and
Publishers. The author, who received his bachelor's degree in Music Theory and Composition
with a minor in Music Business from Belmont College in 1991, and is currently a juris doctor-
ate candidate at Florida State University College of Law, has attempted to present a balanced
analysis of this problem from both an artistic and a legal standpoint.
I. See Jon Pareles, Digital Technology Changing Music, N.Y. Tsmss, Oct. 16, 1986, at
C23 ("Artistically, sampling offers musicians unparalleled flexibility. It puts virtually any
sound-live or recorded, natural or synthetic-at a performer's finger tips, allowing musicians
to reshape borrowed sound in new contexts.").
2. See David Goldberg & Robert J. Bernstein, Reflections on Sampling, N.Y.L.J., Jan.
15, 1993, at 3 ("Sampling has been called everything from an 'art form' to 'stealing' and has
provoked much litigation since its advent ...." (citations omitted)); Pareles, supra note 1, at
C23 ("Taking one note off a cassette and mucking about with it is one thing. But if you have a
session musician in and sample him and don't hire him for the next track, that's a very bad
thing." (quoting Trevor Horn, producer)); Chuck Philips, Songwriter Wins Large Settlement
in Rap Suit, L.A. TamEs, Jan. 1, 1992, at F l (Sampled songwriter's attorney stated "[s]ampling
is a euphemism that was developed by the music industry to mask what is obviously thievery."
Another sampled musician added that "[a]nybody who can honestly say sampling is some sort
of creativity has never done anything creative."); Send in the Clones: Digital Sampling a Sound
Revelation, Cm. Tiua., Oct. 10, 1986, at 86 [hereinafter Send in the Clones]; Terri Thompson
et al., Music is Alive with the Sound of High Tech, Bus. WK., Oct. 26, 1987, at 114.
3. See Robert G. Sugarman & Joseph P. Salvo, Sampling Gives Law A New Mix; Whose
Rights?, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 11, 1991, at 21.
4. See Richard Harrington, The Groove Robbers' Judgement; Order on 'Sampling'
Songs May Be Rap Landmark, WASH. PosT, Dec. 25, 1991, at DI, D7 ("[A]rtists often ask
ridiculous prices for permission to sample their works. Fees can range from $500 to $50,000,
and some albums have been delayed, and tracks removed, when clearances proved either too
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effect, the music industry is fighting against itself as it tries to legiti-
mize this recent musical innovation.
Many artists use sampling in composition, production, and per-
formance. The digital sampler, a powerful musical tool, enables mu-
sicians to record, or "sample," any sound and play it back at the
touch of a button. Companies that market digital samplers, including
Fairlight, E-mu, Ensoniq, Casio, and Roland, make available to their
customers a library of studio-recorded samples.5 Typical samples in-
clude traditional instruments, such as grand pianos, pipe organs, vio-
lins, cellos, wind and percussion instruments, as well as choirs,
screams, and other simple vocal sounds. Non-traditional samples in-
clude industrial sounds, such as the starting of an automobile or a
metal pipe dragging across concrete, and naturally occurring sounds,
such as birds, falling rain, or the barking of a dog. Many recording
artists, including Peter Gabriel, Kate Bush, Art of Noise, Fishbone,
Kraftwerk, and Depeche Mode, use digital samples like these to add a
rich texture to their music. 6
The use of these types of sampled sounds, however, did not spark
the debate that now plagues the recording industry. Rather, the con-
troversy arose when recording artists began to use samples of previ-
ously released songs in their own creations. For instance, rap music
largely depends upon sampling technology. 7 Indeed, this genre has its
foundation in the reuse and rearrangement of older songs.' For exam-
expensive or were simply not negotiable."); see also Sugarman & Salvo, supra note 3, at 22 (the
average fee for the use of a master recording ranges between $1,500 and $3,000).
That sampling may become too expensive for the recording artist may actually have some
positive implications. See Sheila Rule, Record Companies Are Challenging 'Sampling' in Rap,
N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 21, 1992, at C13.
The high cost of sampling, combined with a desire to keep rap fresh and innovative,
has also led some artists to use more original music and real musical instruments;
L.L. Cool J has toured with a band, and Hammer made his most recent album,
"Too Legit to Quit," entirely without samples.
Id. at C18.
5. See E. Scott Johnson, Note, Protecting Distinctive Sounds: The Challenge of Digital
Sampling, 2 J.L. & TECH. 273, 275 (1987); Tom Moon, Music Technology Opens a Pandora's
Box['] Digital Sampling Creates New Frontiers for Musicians-and Potential Chaos for Copy-
rights, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 10, 1988, at 1K.
6. For representative recordings, listen to PETER GABRIEL, SECUrrY (Geffen Records
1982); KATE BUSH, THE DREAMING (EMI America Records 1982); ART OF NOISE, IN-No-SENSE?
NONSENSE (Chrysalis Records, Inc. 1987); FISHBONE, THE REALrrY OF MY SURROUNDINGS (Co-
lumbia Records 1991); KRAFrwE uc, ELECTRIC CAFE (Warner Brothers Records 1986); and DE-
FECHE MODE, BLACK CELEBRATION (Sire Records 1986).
7. See Rule, supra note 4, at C13.
8. See Elizabeth Drake & John Swenson, What Future for Musical Sampling?, PHILA.
INQUIRER, May 24, 1987, at Hll.
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ple, in "Rapper's Delight," 9 the song that signaled the beginning of
the rap era, the SugarHill Gang used the instrumental music from
Chic's hit "Good Times" 0 as the song's underlying theme. 1
The reuse of previously recorded music has prompted various legal
developments in the music industry. When bodyguard-turned-rapper
Tone-Loc's surprise hit song "Wild Thing"' 2 used the opening drum
fill and bits of music from Van Halen's "Jamie's Crying,"' 3 his rec-
ord label negotiated a license for that use. 4 Nonetheless, some re-
cording artists, such as De la Soul, the Beastie Boys, and Biz Markie,
have sampled portions of other artists' recordings without authoriza-
tion from the original copyright owner and have altered the samples
in some fashion, 5 used the samples as sound bites, or simply
"looped' '1 6 the samples, thereby adding to their new creation. 17 This
practice of verbatim copying directly challenges the copyright law.
Typically, artists only sample very small portions of vocals and/or
music. Musicians usually pick samples for their quintessence. Because
such samples usually constitute fairly brief portions of the original
songs, most musicians do not acknowledge the source of the sample
or seek consent from the original copyright owners under the auspices
of the de minimis or fair use doctrines." Some rap artists, such as
Hammer and Vanilla Ice, have sampled much longer portions of mu-
sic and have avoided liability by sharing writing credits with the au-
9. SUGARHILL GANG, Rapper's Delight, re-recorded on RAP HALL OF FAME (K-Tel Int'l
(USA) 1992).
10. CHIc, Good Times, on DANCE, DANCE, DANCE - THE BEST Or CHIC (Atlantic Records
1979).
11. Harrington, supra note 4, at D7.
12. ToNE-Loc, Wild Thing, on LOCED AFTER DARK (Delicious Vinyl 1988).
13. VAN HALEN, Jamie's Crying, on VAN HALEN (Warner Bros. Records 1978).
14. See John Horn, Borrowed Performances May Get Rappers in Trouble, DET. FREE
PRESS, June 7, 1989, at IB. Tone-Loc apparently paid a flat fee of several hundred dollars to
use the samples. Id.
15. For an example of an altered sample and its possible legal repercussions, see Bruce L.
Flanders, Barbarians at the Gate: New Technologies for Handling Information Pose a Crisis
Over Intellectual Property, 22 Am. LnR. 668 (July-Aug. 1991) (De la Soul sampled the Turtles'
"You Showed Me," THE TURTLES, You Showed Me, re-recorded on, THE BEST OF THE TURTLES
(Rhino Records 1984), for their song "Transmitting Live From Mars," DE LA SOUL, Transmit-
ting Live From Mars, on 3 FEET HIo AND RISING (Tommy Boy Records 1989), and were sued
for $ 1.7-million).
16. Looping is achieved when the sound or sample returns to its beginning upon reaching
its end.
17. For an example of a looped sample and its legal repercussions, see Grand Upright
Music, Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); see also infra
notes 169-90 and accompanying text.
18. See Horn, supra note 14, at 1B; Harrington, supra note 4, at D7.
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thors of the sampled compositions. 1 9 By recycling previously recorded
material, these artists have created a new and enduring form of mu-
sic. Although many have characterized rap as a temporary musical
trend, similar to disco or punk rock, its apparent staying power has
surprised critics and brought to the forefront various legal issues as-
sociated with digital sampling technology.
This Comment describes the evolution of digital sampling and its
compatibility with traditional fair use analysis.20 It argues that the
fair use doctrine should remain a viable defense to claims that sam-
pling constitutes copyright infringement. In addition, this Comment
demonstrates that copyright law, particularly the fair use doctrine,
provides an adequate means by which to address the legal disputes
that have emerged as a result of digital sampling. Specifically, the fair
use doctrine permits courts to consider factors not enumerated by
statute when addressing infringement issues. This Comment evaluates
judicial application of the statutory fair use factors, as well as several
optional factors specific to digital sampling, in a digital sampling
context. Finally, the Comment examines recent case law regarding
digital sampling and its impact upon the music industry.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF DIGITAL SAMPLING
Essentially, a digital sampling keyboard, or digital sampler, is a
highly sophisticated tape recorder capable of reproducing any sound
or an aggregate of sounds at any desired pitch. Musicians can enter
sounds into the sampler from either a microphone or a direct line,
such as a tape or compact disc player. The sampler stores the wave-
form produced by the sound as a stream of binary numbers, allowing
for perfect reproduction.2" The data entered into the sampler may be
freely manipulated. For instance, the sampler can alter each sound,
or portions of a sound, by playing it backwards, truncating or short-
ening it, repeating it, splicing it together with another sound, or a
combination of any of these methods. In addition, the sampler can
transpose one sampled note across the entire keyboard to replicate
the original range of the sampled instrument. The sampler's ability to
alter and manipulate recorded sounds gives it a significant advantage
19. See Guy Garcia, Play It Again. Sampler; A Revolutionary Device Turns Pop on its
Ear by Enabling Musicians to Beg, Borrow and Steal Sounds From All Over, TBE, June 3,
1991, at 69.
20. For an explanation of the fair use doctrine, see infra notes 52-61 and accompanying
text; see also infra notes 62-143 and accompanying text.
21. For a thorough explanation of digital recording methods, see STANLEY R. ALTrEN, Au-
1i IN MEDIA 185-90 (2d ed. 1986).
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over a synthesizer, which merely electronically emulates traditional
instruments.
Using tape recordings to compose a piece of music is not a new
phenomenon. Throughout modern history, each new musical era has
paid homage to its predecessors by "quoting" the previous era's mu-
sical stylings in its own music. 22 For example, in the early 1940s,
"musique concr&e' '23 composers, such as Pierre Schaeffer and Pierre
Henry, cut, spliced, and manipulated pre-recorded tapes in creating
their music. 24 In the early 1960s, the Mellotron, the precursor to the
modern string synthesizer, entered the music scene. 25 This instrument
used tape loops of pre-recorded sounds to create new sounds.2 6 The
digital sampler differs from the Mellotron only in the medium it uses
to store the pre-recorded sound. Instead of saving the sound as com-
plex magnetic fluctuations on standard audio tape, as is done in ana-
log recordings, 27 the sampler stores the sound as a series of numbers
in a computer. This eliminates any possibility of sound deterioration
due to physical erosion of, or any actual damage to, the tape.
Anytime new technology emerges that displaces studio musicians or
drastically reduces the amount of time spent recording in the studio,
the music industry becomes alarmed. 28 The introduction of the syn-
thesizer caused just such an effect, as did the advent of affordable
digital sampling. 29 The combination of a sampler and a multi-track
tape recorder30 essentially grants musicians access to an entire orches-
22. Musical "quotation" is the analog corollary to digital sampling. A musical "quote" is
the taking of a distinctive and recognizable portion of another era's or composer's music and
using it in a new context. See Garcia, supra note 19, at 69 ("The arts have a long tradition of
allusion and quotation, often with resonant effects.").
23. "Musique concrete" is a musical style developed by French electrical engineers and
radio broadcasters that combined all kinds of incidental musical, nonmusical, and unmusical
sounds and noises into a sonic collage. See THE NEw HARVAD DICTIONARY OF Music 281 (Don
Michael Randel ed., rev. ed. 2d ed. 1986); ScHRUIER PRONOUNCINO POCKET MA'UAL OF Muss-
CAL TERms 147 (Theodore Baker ed., 1978).
24. Bernard Krause, Electronic Music, in MAKINO Music: THE GUmE TO WRITING, PER-
FORMING & REcoRwsNG 126 (George Martin ed., 1983) [hereinafter MAKNo MusIc].
25. See Pareles, supra note 1, at C23; Johnson, supra note 5, at 274.
26. Simon Frith, Popular Music 1950-1980, in MAKINO Music, supra note 24, at 18, 48.
27. Analog recording involves the encoding and decoding of an audio signal whose wave-
form resembles that of the original. For a more thorough explanation of analog recording, see
ALTEN, supra note 21, at 181-85.
28. See Thompson. supra note 2, at 116 ("Now that entire orchestras can be replaced by
synthesizers, some worry that thousands of musicians may be put out of work.").
29. See Johnson, supra note 5, at 274-75.
30. A multi-track tape recorder is a cassette recorder that enables sounds recorded at dif-
ferent times to be stored separately on the same tape. It allows one to record an instrument on
one portion ("track") of the tape, and then record another instrument on another track in
synchronization with it, all without erasing the previously-recorded track.
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tra, including brass and percussion, with only minimal investment.
This technology makes large, expensive studio sessions unnecessary
and places today's most popular instrumental sounds at the musi-
cian's fingertips.
Although digital sampling can accurately reproduce the sound of a
specific instrument, it does have limitations. A sampler cannot faith-
fully reproduce a musician's technique, phrasing, and "feel."1 3' For
instance, a musician can sample Andr~s Segovia32 playing a note on
his classical guitar, but a musician could never use a sampler to accu-
rately duplicate Segovia playing a Bach transcription. Similarly, the
sampler permits an artist to sample the sound of a vintage instru-
ment, such as a Stradivarius violin; but the sampler cannot replicate
the style and technique of a virtuoso violinist playing such an instru-
ment. Thus, professional musicians have not been totally displaced
by this new technology and still have much to offer by way of their
technique, skill, and personalized sound.
Digital sampling technology is a powerful creative tool for musi-
cians. But of more import, for the purposes of this Comment, is the
ability to use the sampler to incorporate another's copyrighted mate-
rial into a new work. Because some musicians do not obtain permis-
sion to use this copyrighted material, the legal implications of digital
sampling must be discussed.
IIl. COPYRIGHT PROTECTION AND THE FAIR USE DOCTRINE
Copyright protection has its roots in the United States Constitu-
tion. Article I, section 8, clause 8, provides that Congress shall have
the power "[tlo promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." 33 Indeed, "[tihe
purpose of copyright is to create incentives for creative effort. 3 4 Sec-
tion 106 of the 1976 Copyright Act codified the five exclusive rights
of the copyright owner: the right of reproduction, the right to pre-
pare a derivative work, the right to distribute the work, the right to
perform the work, and the right to publicly display the work. 5
Copyright infringement occurs when someone, without authoriza-
tion from the copyright owner, exercises one or more of the copyright
31. See Pareles, supra note 1, at C23; Moon, supra note 5, at 10K.
32. Andr~s Segovia (1893-1987) was a virtuoso classical guitarist and the founding father
of the modern classical guitar movement.
33. U.S. CoNsT. art I, § 8, cl. 8.
34. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 450 (1984).
35. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1988).
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owner's exclusive rights. 6 Generally, a plaintiff claiming copyright
infringement must prove that he or she owns the copyright and that
the defendant has copied the work."7 In a copyright infringement case
involving digital sampling, the court must distinguish between two
separate copyrights: the copyright in the underlying musical work and
the copyright in the sound recording.38 The author or composer of
the underlying musical work owns a copyright in the music and any
accompanying words. 39 Separate and distinct from the copyright in
the underlying musical work is the copyright in the recorded perform-
ance of that musical work, or the "sound recording."'' The copy-
right owner of the underlying musical work enjoys all five of the
exclusive rights;4 1 however, the copyright owner in the sound record-
ing only enjoys the exclusive rights to reproduce the sound recording,
to prepare a derivative work of the sound recording, and to distribute
copies of the sound recording. 42 While a sample may infringe upon
the sound recording by appropriating a small but distinctive part of
the recording, it may not infringe upon the underlying musical work
as the portion sampled may qualify as de minimis.43 Therefore, the
outcome of an infringement case depends upon which of the copy-
right owners is involved.
An issue that often emerges in digital sampling infringement cases
is whether the sampled material is copyrightable in itself. Much con-
troversy has arisen over musicians sampling one or two notes of a
work." To qualify as a copyrightable sound recording, the work must
"result from the fixation of a series of musical, spoken, or other
sounds . . . . "' By implication, one note, chord, or sound effect
alone cannot be copyrighted-rather, an aggregate of sounds must
exist.
36. Id. § 501(a).
37. See generally MELVILLE B. NimaEas & DAvID NrmMER, 3 NimMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13
(1992).
38. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 (definition of sound recording), 102(2) (1988).
39. Id. § 102.
40. The Copyright Act defines sound recordings as "works that result from the fixation of
a series of musical, spoken, or other sounds .. . regardless of the nature of the material ob-
jects, such as disks, tapes, or other phonorecords, in which they are embodied." Id. § 101.
41. Id. § 106. If a delineation of affected works is absent from the first three exclusive
rights in section 106, and the remaining two explicitly apply to "musical ... works," the copy-
right owner in the musical work enjoys all five exclusive rights. Id.
42. Id. § 114(a).
43. See Johnson, supra note 5, at 290.
44. See Flanders, supra note 15, at 668.
45. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added).
1993]
142 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:135
Many artists use samples that contain only one note. Common ex-
amples of these one-note samples include orchestra "hits" 46 and
drum samples. Frequently, artists and producers use unauthorized
drum samples of Phil Collins, drummer and vocalist of the group
Genesis, in their commercial recordings. In fact, Phil Collins is prob-
ably the most sampled drummer today.47 Many musicians have sam-
pled his distinctive drum sound and used it in their own drum
tracks .48
Although some believe that sampling even one note or chord of
someone's trademark sound constitutes infringement, no infringe-
ment occurs in this situation under present copyright law.4 9 Sampling
complete drum patterns from other's recordings, however, may sub-
ject an artist to an infringement suit. 0 Yet, the ease with which tech-
nology allows someone to sample the recording of a drum machine,
together with the low cost of purchasing a drum machine and repli-
cating the same drum pattern, present significant evidentiary hurdles
in infringement suits."' Accordingly, unless the plaintiff can prove
that the defendant has sampled a copyrightable portion of either the
underlying composition or the sound recording, the court may not
find the defendant liable for copyright infringement. As most of to-
day's samples are of uncopyrightable material, the possibility of in-
fringement remains minimal.
Of all the limitations imposed upon a copyright owner's exclusive
rights, the fair use doctrine is probably the most significant. 52 Even
46. An example of an orchestra "hit" is the last chord of any John Phillip Sousa march,
like "Stars and Stripes Forever." JOHN PrILLIP SOUSA, Stars and Stripes Forever, re-recorded
on GREATEST AmERucA MAucHss II (Angel Records 1992). For an example of a sampled or-
chestra hit and its use, listen to KATE BusH, The Dreaming, on THE DREAMING (EMI America
Records 1982).
47. See Flanders, supra note 15, at 668.
48. Id.
49. See Jon Pareles, In Pop, Whose Song Is It, Anyway?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1989, § 2,
at 1, 26. It could be argued that a sample such as an orchestra "hit" is copyrightable because it
qualifies as an aggregate of sounds due to the many instruments sounding at once. The statute
and the legislative history, however, do not define what constitutes a series or aggregate of
sounds. An orchestra "hit" could be analogized to a chord, a simultaneous sounding of single
notes which is, by definition, not copyrightable. For a thorough discussion of digital sampling
and distinctive sound copyrights, see Johnson, supra note 5.
50. See Robert G. Sugarman & Joseph P. Salvo, Sampling Case Makes Music Labels
Sweat, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 16, 1992, at 34.
51. Id. Lawrence Stanley, an attorney who runs a sample clearing house, estimates that
approximately 99 percent of the drum samples embodied in recordings currently out on the
market are not cleared. Rule, supra note 4, at C13.
52. ROBERT A. GORMAN, COPYRIGHT LAW 93 (1991). Many authors have dismissed the fair
use defense in a digital sampling infringement context. See, e.g., Bruce J. McGiverin, Digital
Sound Sampling, Copyright and Publicity: Protecting Against the Electronic Appropriation of
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though a copyright owner may prove an infringement, a defendant
may assert the fair use defense and avoid liability. This judicially-
created doctrine first appeared in the 1841 case of Folsom v. Marsh."
Justice Story delineated the doctrine's underlying policies, specifying
that quotations of copyrighted material in works such as biographies
or critical commentaries may be excusable as a fair use;14 nonetheless,
"[i]f so much is taken, that the value of the original is sensibly dimin-
ished, or the labors of the original author are substantially to an inju-
rious extent appropriated by another," then an infringement has
occurred." Additionally, Justice Story stated that the court should
consider "the nature and objects of the selections made, the quantity
and value of the materials used, and the degree in which the use may
prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or supersede the objects,
of the original work. ' '56
In 1976, Congress codified the common law fair use doctrine in
section 107 of the 1976 Copyright Act.17 Today, section 107 of Title
17 provides, in pertinent part:
"[Tihe fair use of a copyrighted work . . . for purposes such as
criticism, comment, . . . scholarship, or research, is not an
infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of
a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be
considered shall include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use
is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to
the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work.
Sounds, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1723, 1736-38 (1987); Jeffrey S. Newton, Digital Sampling: The
Copyright Considerations of a New Technological Use of Musical Performance, I1 HASTINGS
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 671, 709-12 (1989); Note, A New Spin on Music Sampling: A Case for Fair
Pay, 105 HA~v. L. REV. 726, 736-39 (1992) [hereinafter A New Spin on Music Sampling]; but
see Molly McGraw, Sound Sampling Protection and Infringement in Today's Music Industry, 4
HIGH TECH. L.J. 147, 167 (1989)("IT]o deny a fair use defense would be to effectively elimi-
nate the use of digital splicing as an avenue of creative expression."); James P. Allen, Jr.,
Comment, Look What They've Done to My Song Ma-Digital Sampling in the 90's: A Legal
Challenge for the Music Industry, 9 U. MiAmi ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 179, 197-98 (1992).
53. 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901).
54. Id. at 348.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988).
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The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of
fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of all the above
factors.""s
Defendants may assert the fair use doctrine in any copyright infringe-
ment case, including cases involving infringement of a book,5 9 a pho-
tograph, 6° or a computer program. 61 The court will decide each case
on its own particular facts, weighing each of the statutory factors.
The four fair use factors in the statute, however, are not the only
ones a court may consider; they are merely illustrative rather than
exclusive. The language of the statute, which reads "factors to be
considered shall include," implies the consideration of non-enumer-
ated items. 62 Thus, the law grants the trial judge the discretion to
weigh other factors in the analysis. 63 Accordingly, judicial discretion
can play a significant role in digital sampling infringement cases if
judges choose to consider various factors that are better suited for an
accurate fair use determination. The next section provides an analysis
of each statutory factor and assesses its weight in a sampling infringe-
ment case. A listing and evaluation of the additional factors that are
relevant to a sampling infringement suit follows the analysis of the
statutory factors.
A. The First Factor: The Purpose and Character of the Use
1. Commercial Use vs. Non-Profit Use
Congress has identified certain uses that typically fall within the
scope of fair use. The statute lists "criticism, comment, news report-
ing, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholar-
ship, or research"' as possible candidates for fair use.64 Additionally,
within the legislative history itself, Congress has suggested other pos-
sible fair uses, such as parody, a summary of an address, and an in-
advertent reproduction in a news broadcast of a work located at the
scene of the broadcast. 65 Nevertheless, quoting another's work only
58. Id., as amended by Pub. L. No. 102-492, 106 Stat. 3145 (1992).
59. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
60. See Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 310-12 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 365
(1992).
61. See Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 843 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
62. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988). Additionally, section 101 states that "[tlhe terms 'including'
and 'such as' are illustrative and not limitative." Id. § 101.
63. See infra notes 144-68 and accompanying text.
64. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988).
65. H.R. REp. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5679 [hereinafter 1976 HousE REPORT 1476].
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in news stories, critical comments, or educational materials will not
automatically absolve the user of liability for copyright infringe-
ment." Because fair use is "an equitable rule of reason," an exclusive
list of fair uses does not and should not exist, as each case is to be
determined on an ad hoc basis. 67
While many commentators have suggested that Congress should re-
vise the copyright laws to accommodate the legal implications of digi-
tal sampling, 61 attorneys in the Copyright Public Information Office
in Washington, D.C. believe the current copyright law effectively ad-
dresses the sampling issueA9 The drafters of section 107 built flexibil-
ity into the fair use doctrine to accommodate periods "of rapid
technological change,'" 0 such as the evolution of digital sampling.
Nevertheless, musicians are taking added precautions to protect their
work. For example, rock musician Frank Zappa placed his own no-
sampling notices on his albums.7' Despite concern among musicians,
current copyright law can effectively accommodate the legal ramifica-
tions produced by sampling technology, provided the courts ade-
quately consider additional factors that are relevant to sampling.
Section 107(1) provides that the court, when determining whether a
particular use is a fair use, shall consider "the purpose and character
of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is
for nonprofit educational purposes. ''72 The United States Supreme
Court, in Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,73
66. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985) (rejecting
defendant's fair use defense, as defendant published excerpts from unpublished biography
without copyright owner's permission); Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F.
Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (rejecting the fair use defense asserted by a photocopying service
that compiled excerpts from plaintiff's books).
67. See 1976 HOUSE REPORT 1476, supra note 65, at 5679.
68. "Copyright attorney Bill Krasilovsky, working with the American Federation of Mu-
sic, suggests that the copyright laws will have to be rewritten, so that an artist's individual
sounds can be protected, as well as a specific sequence of sounds." Send in the Clones, supra
note 2, at 86. Bill Krasilovsky, along with Sidney Shemel, authored Tins BusNEss OF Music,
(Billboard Publications, Inc. 5th rev. ed. 1985), which has become the authoritative handbook
of the music business; see also Elizabeth Drake, Digital Sampling: Looming Copyright Prob-
lem, UPI, May 8, 1987, BC Cycle (Frank Zappa states that because the 1976 Copyright Act was
drafted before the advent of sampling, the law should be updated).
69. See Drake, supra note 68.
70. See 1976 HOUsE REPORT 1476, supra note 65, at 5680.
71. Horn, supra note 14, at IB (Zappa's warning states: "Unauthorized reproduction-
sampling is a violation of applicable laws and subject to criminal prosecution.").
72. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (1988).
73. 471 U.S. 539 (1985). In Harper 8 Row, THt NATION magazine received, from an un-
disclosed source, a copy of President Ford's then unpublished autobiography. Id. Without au-
thorization, the magazine then published quotes from the manuscript which resulted in the
cancellation of the exclusive publishing agreement between President Ford and TIME. Id. The
United States Supreme Court ultimately rejected the defendant's assertion of fair use. Id.
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stated that a commercial or for-profit purpose "tends to weigh
against a finding of fair use." '74 Moreover, in Sony Corp. of America
v. Universal City Studios, Inc.," the Court noted that although this
presumption is strong, the defendant can rebut it.76 In Harper &
Row, the Court explained that the thrust of the profit/nonprofit dis-
tinction lies not in whether the user's sole motive was financial gain,
but in "whether the user stands to profit from exploitation of the
copyrighted material without paying the customary price." 7 Accord-
ingly, if the alleged infringer stands to make any profit from the use
of the sample, this first factor will automatically weigh against a find-
ing of fair use.
The presumptions that arise from Harper & Row and Sony are not
entirely proper in a digital sampling context. First, because sampling
technology is so new, no set customary price exists for the use of a
sample. Second, in Harper & Row, the Court noted that the defen-
dant intended to supplant Harper & Row's "commercially valuable
right of first publication."s7 In a digital sampling context, the sample
is almost always taken from an already distributed work. As such,
the user of the sample usually cannot usurp the sampled composi-
tion's market, as it already has claimed its share. Third, a musician
almost always writes a song for commercial purposes. Consequently,
if the presumptions from Harper & Row and Sony are followed in
sampling infringement suits, musicians will generally never be able to
establish that this first fair use factor weighs in their favor. Allowing
this first factor to weigh against a finding of fair use simply because
74. Id. at 562 (emphasis added); but see Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253
(2d Cir. 1986)("[C]ommercial nature of a use is a matter of degree, not an absolute ......
cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1059 (1987).
75. 464 U.S. 417 (1984). The Supreme Court, in Sony, used the fair use doctrine to ab-
solve Sony of liability for, inter alia, contributory copyright infringement caused by its video
tape recorder's ability to time-shift television broadcasts. Id.
76. Id. at 451.
77. 471 U.S. at 562; but see New Era Publications Int'l, ApS v. Carol Publishing Group,
729 F. Supp. 992, 996 (S.D.N.Y)("[T]he mere fact that a work [which uses copyrighted materi-
als) may produce pecuniary gain for its author or publisher is not dispositive of a claim of fair
use." (citation omitted)), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 904 F.2d 152 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 297 (1990).
78. Id. Congress recently amended section 107 by adding the following sentence after the
fourth factor: "The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if
such finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors." Pub. L. No. 102-492, 106
Stat. 3145 (1992). Apparently as a reaction to the Harper & Row decision and its progeny
(Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 890 (1987), and
New Era Publications v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1989), cert denied, 493 U.S.
1094 (1990)), Congress added this amendment to quash any court's per se finding of no fair use
simply because the work quoted was unpublished. See David Goldberg & Robert J. Bernstein,
The 102d Congress, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 20, 1992, at 3.
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the musician used the sample in a song runs counter to the statute's
requirement of an ad hoc determination. 79 Thus, the Harper & Row!
Sony profit/nonprofit analysis is improper in the digital sampling
context.
2. Transformative/Productive Uses
Courts have distorted the presumption that commercial uses are
unfair by strictly applying it beyond its original context. They have
practically converted this presumption into a per se rule weighing
heavily against fair use. 0 Courts should, however, recognize that var-
ying degrees of commercial uses exist. In Sony,"' the Supreme Court
noted that "[t]he distinction between 'productive' and 'unproductive'
uses may be helpful in calibrating the balance" of the interests of the
copyright owner and the alleged infringer. 2 Likewise, in Basic Books,
Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp.,"3 the district court adopted a more
preferable "transformative use"/"commercial use" comparison. 4 A
transformative use is one that "must employ the quoted matter in a
different manner or for a different purpose from the original." 85 In
contrast, a pure commercial use simply re-employs the quoted matter
in the same mode as its original use. 86 Although Basic Books dealt
79. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
80. See Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 972 F.2d 1429 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. granted
in part, 113 S. Ct. 1642 (1993); Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc., 780
F. Supp. 182, 185 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (showing hostility toward unauthorized sampling, and cit-
ing, among other factors, that defendants' sole aim "was to sell thousands upon thousands of
records").
81. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
82. Id. at 455 n.40.
83. 758 F. Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
84. Id. at 1530-31.
85. Id. at 1530 (citation omitted). In Basic Books, District Judge Motley stated that "[in
this case, there was absolutely no literary effort made by Kinko's to expand upon or contex-
tualize the materials copied." Id. at 1530-31. Therefore, it could be argued that simply placing
the sample in a different context (i.e., a different song) would suffice as a transformative use.
But see id. at 1531 n.5 (Weinreb argued that the efficiency of a transformative use analysis is
overstated and asserted that "[a] use may serve an important, socially useful purpose without
being transformative, simply by making the copied material available." (quoting Lloyd L.
Weinreb, Fair's Fair: A Comment on the Fair Use Doctrine, 103 HARv. L. REV. 1137, 1143
(1990)). With respect to this issue, Lloyd L. Weinreb has stated:
One may wonder whether the publication of material in a new 'package' may not
itself constitute a transformative use. For example, the publication of a volume of
Salinger's letters would have a purpose entirely different from that which prompted
Salinger to write and send the letters contained in the volume. Preparing the collec-
tion involves effort and, perhaps, judgment of a kind that often is enough to sustain
a copyright.
Weinreb, supra, at 1143.
86. See Basic Books, Inc., 758 F. Supp. at 1530 (quoting Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair
Use Standard, 103 HARv. L. REV. 1105, 1111 (1990)).
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with bulk copying and repackaging of selected reading materials for
educational "class packs," 7 the productive (transformative)/non-
productive (commercial) analysis that it applied is more appropriate
in a digital sampling infringement action than the Harper & Row/
Sony presumption that all commercial uses are unfair.
Within a transformative/commercial analysis, an exploitative or
"commercial" use, one purely for financial gain and without the ad-
dition of any substantial new material, would weigh heavily against a
finding of fair use. For example, if Hammer had not obtained a li-
cense to use Rick James' "Super Freak," 88 but had instead sampled
the two bars upon which the song is built and added his own lyrics, it
is doubtful that a court would find Hammer's use of the sample to be
a fair use. Without the licensing, Hammer's arrangement of the song
and the addition of his own lyrics would most likely not have risen to
the level of substantial creativity needed to satisfy the standard for
transformative use. Accordingly, without sufficient creativity, the
first enumerated factor will not support a finding of fair use.
In contrast, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Cir-
cuit, in Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell,"9 placed a great deal of
emphasis on the commercial use of the plaintiff's copyright in reject-
ing the defendants' assertion of fair use. 90 The Supreme Court has
granted certiorari on this case and, hopefully, will provide a defini-
tive ruling regarding Acuff-Rose's narrow analysis. 9' Notwithstand-
ing the Sixth Circuit's conclusion, a per se finding for the copyright
owner on this first factor, based solely on the fact that the alleged
infringer profited in some way from the use, is inappropriate in a
sampling infringement case. That a musician makes money from a
song, which he or she created by employing a small sample of anoth-
er's sound recording, should not compel a finding of infringement.
Although sampling may theoretically violate black letter copyright
law, not all infringements are actionable. As aptly put by Trevor
Horn, record producer for groups such as Yes and Art of Noise, "In
the end, it's the song that sells-not the sample." 92
87. Id. at 1526.
88. RIcK JAMES, Super Freak, on STREET SONGS (Motown Records 1981).
89. 972 F.2d 1429 (6th Cir. 1992), cert.granted in part, 113 S. Ct. 1642 (1993).
90. Id. at 1436-37. Although Acuff-Rose was a parody case, its emphasis on the commer-
cial nature of the recording may be analogized to a sampling infringement case. The court, in
its analysis, essentially created a per se rule in favor of the copyright owner with respect to the
use factor where the parodist made any profit. Id.
91. 113 S. Ct. 1642 (1993).
92. See Pareles, supra note 1, at C23. Exceptions to this general rule exist, as demon-
strated by Hammer's song, "U Can't Touch This," M. C. HAMMER, U Can't Touch This, on
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Most artists who use samples simply combine old and new material
to produce a composition entirely different from the sampled copy-
right.93 When a musician uses a sample in a context different from
the sampled copyright's original context, a court may be inclined to
find that use transformative. Accordingly, the appropriate issue in a
digital sampling infringement case should be whether the sample is a
foundation for a new musical statement or merely an effect.94 If the
sample is the foundation for a new musical statement, the court
should classify the use as transformative and weigh this factor in fa-
vor of a finding of fair use. If the musician simply uses the sample as
an effect, the analysis should then hinge upon the first three fair use
factors: the length of the sample, its prominence within the context of
the new song and in relation to the original recording, and the nature
of the use. Accordingly, courts should analyze the purpose of the
sample's use according to Basic Books' transformative analysis rather
than Sony's simple focus upon potential profits.
B. The Second Factor: The Nature of the Copyrighted Work
The second factor focuses upon the nature of the copyrighted, or
sampled, work. In evaluating this factor, courts have examined
whether the work is published or unpublished, and/or factual or fic-
tional. In addition, courts have considered "whether the work was
creative, imaginative, and original, ... and whether it represented a
substantial investment of time and labor made in anticipation of a
financial return." 95 This second factor proves extremely important in
cases concerning appropriations of, or quotes from, sources contain-
ing factual material, such as telephone directories or biographies. 96 In
a sampling suit, however, this factor assumes a different significance.
PLEASE HAMMER, DON'T HURT 'EM (Capitol Records 1990), which used Rick James' music
from "Super Freak," supra note 88, as its underlying musical theme. Other examples include
"Rapper's Delight," supra note 9, by the SugarHill Gang and Biz Markie's use of "Alone
Again, Naturally," GILBERT O'SULLIVAN, Alone Again, Naturally, re-recorded on 70's GREAT-
EST ROCK HITS VOL. 9 (Priority Records 1991), for his song "Alone Again," BIZ MARIEs,
Alone Again, on I NEED A HAIRCUT (Cold Chillin' Records 1991). Biz Markie, however, was
recently enjoined from distributing this song as he did not secure a license to use the copy-
righted material. See infra notes 169-86 and accompanying text.
93. See David Browne, No Free Samples?, ENT. WKLY, Jan. 24, 1992, at 54.
94. See Tom Moon, Music Sampling or Stealing: Who Owns Sounds of Music?, ST. Louis
POST DISPATCH, Jan. 24, 1988, at 3E (statement of producer/engineer Bruce Miller).
95. MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 182 (2d Cir. 1981) (citations omitted).
96. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Ill S. Ct. 1282 (1991); Harper &
Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985); Salinger v. Random House, Inc.,
811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 890 (1987).
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The sample's function in the new composition is probably insignifi-
cant when compared to the remainder of the new song.9 7 That a copy-
right owner could enjoin an artist from using a sample of the
copyright owner's composition, even though the sample is but a very
minor part of the new composition, seems ironic. The typical rap
song uses many different samples, presenting them in the same man-
ner as a graphic artist would present a collage. 8 A large amount of
creativity goes into choosing which portions of songs to sample and
placing those samples in the new work. Additionally, if each of the
samples consists of only a small phrase or even a single word, the
copyright owner may have difficulty trying to assert an infringement
claim.9 A musician, however, cannot ride another's wave of musical
reputation without authorization or compensation.'00 Thus, unless the
use constitutes more than a mere reproduction of the original copy-
right in its original context, this second factor will probably weigh in
the favor of the plaintiff.
This second factor also focuses on the published or unpublished
nature of the copyrighted work. In Harper & Row, the Court relied
heavily upon the unpublished status of President Ford's autobiogra-
phy in rejecting the defendant's assertion of fair use. l0' Harper &
Row is distinguishable from a digital sampling infringement scenario
because it involved the extensive and unauthorized quotation of Pres-
ident Ford's soon-to-be-published autobiography. 10 2 As an unpub-
97. See Pareles, supra note 1, at C23 (quoting Trevor Horn, supra note 2).
98. See Don Snowden, Sampling: A Creative Tool or License to Steal?; The Technology,
L.A. TIMEs, Aug. 6, 1989, at 61 ("Advocates argue that using samples creatively can give a new
dimension to the original song fragment by placing it in a different context. The effect is akin
to an audio collage."); see also Goldberg & Bernstein, supra note 2, at 3 ("Sampling has devel-
oped into a popular and inexpensive way to create a new musical composition from a mosaic of
old sounds."); Garcia, supra note 19, at 69.
99. See supra notes 44-51 and accompanying text.
100. In addition to copyright infringement, one who rides on another's reputation may be
liable for false publicity and/or substantial similarity, among other charges. For a discussion of
possible actions against musicians who sample, see Allen, supra note 52, at 185.
101. 471 U.S. 539, 564 (1985). Writing for the Court in Harper & Row, Justice O'Connor
stated:
The fact that a work is unpublished is a critical element of its "nature." Our prior
discussion established that the scope of fair use is narrower with respect to unpub-
lished works. While even substantial quotations might qualify as fair use in a review
of a published work or a news account of a speech that had been delivered to the
public or disseminated to the press, the author's right to control the first public ap-
pearance of his expression weighs against such use of the work before its release. The
right of first publication encompasses not only the choice whether to publish at all,
but also the choices when, where and in what form first to publish a work.
Id.
102. Id. at 542-43.
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lished work, President Ford's autobiography commanded more
protection 0 3 The exclusive right of distribution is a valuable one, es-
pecially for a biographical work of a President. 104 As presidential au-
tobiographies usually sell in vast quantities, publishers typically
demand the exclusive right to publish them. The copyright owners of
songs that are sampled, however, already have published their works,
making this distinction irrelevant. Therefore, the unpublished nature
analysis is improper in the digital sampling context.
C. The Third Factor: The Amount and Substantiality of the
Portion Used in Relation to the Copyrighted Work as a Whole
The third factor is probably the most critical of the enumerated
fair use factors in a digital sampling infringement case. The statute
provides that the court consider "the amount and substantiality of
the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole."'' 0
As sampling involves the verbatim re-recording of portions of songs,
the outcome of a sampling infringement case may hinge upon this
factor.
1. The Applicability of Taxe to the Third Fair Use Factor
One of the first cases addressing copyright infringement by re-re-
cording was United States v. Taxe.106 Although the district court de-
cided the case upon state law misappropriation grounds, the court's
analysis applies equally well to copyright infringement claims involv-
ing digital sampling. In Taxe, the defendants re-recorded tapes of the
plaintiff's songs and sped them up, slowed them down, deleted cer-
tain frequencies, added echoes, or added synthesizers.' °7 As will be
later discussed, alteration of the original sound recording serves as an
additional unlisted factor that courts should consider in sampling in-
fringement suits. 08 The Taxe court stated that "[i]f the work is pro-
duced by re-recording the original sounds, or 'recapturing' those
sounds, the work infringes."' 9 Essentially, this statement describes
exactly what musicians do when they sample portions of copyrighted
103. Seesupra note 101.
104. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 564 (stating the copyright owner's interest in confiden-
tiality was paramount as the exclusive publication contract required anyone to whom the manu-
script was shown sign an agreement to keep its contents confidential).
105. 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (1988).
106. 380 F. Supp. 1010 (C.D. Cal. 1974), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 540 F.2d 961 (9th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1040 (1977).
107. Id. at 1012.
108. See infra notes 159-60 and accompanying text.
109. Taxe, 380 F. Supp. at 1014.
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sound recordings. The court further stated that "the type of changes
involved in this case... have no bearing on the question of infringe-
ment .... So long as the allegedly infringing work is a product of
re-recording, rather than an independent production, an infringement
exists.""1 According to this analysis, any sampling would make out a
prima facie case of copyright infringement.
In Taxe, the defendants posed two questions:
First, whether the most trivial re-recording (the re-recording of
one or two notes) would be an infringement, and second, whether
re-recording combined with such comprehensive changes that the
work is no longer recognizable as the original work (i.e., extreme
speed changes or running the record in reverse) would constitute an
infringement."'
These issues may also arise in a sampling infringement suit. In partic-
ular, issues pertaining to the first question frequently arise because
such trivial re-recordings comprise the bulk of the samples used by
rap musicians.
As to the first issue, the court accurately stated that re-recordings
may be so "insubstantial . . . as to not infringe."" 2 This conclusion
is consistent with a de minimis use analysis, where the portion of the
copyrighted work that is sampled is so small or trivial that its use
would neither diminish the original's value nor displace the original's
market." 3 The Beastie Boys' sample of the phrase "Yo' Leroy,"
from Jimmy Castor's hit "Return of Leroy, Part I, '" 4 for their song
"Hold It Now, Hit It""' 5 serves as an example of a de minimis use." 6
Some de minimis uses, however, may be subject to causes of action
other than copyright infringement. For example, James Brown's dis-
tinctive yells are a very small portion of his recordings, yet, they are
also so closely associated with him as to be instantly recognizable." 7
Estimates place the number of unauthorized samples of James Brown
110. id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See supra notes 44-51 and accompanying text.
114. JIMMY CASTOR BUNCH, Return of Leroy, Part I, on MAXIMUM STIMULATION (Atlantic
Records 1977).
115. BEASTIE Boys, Hold It Now, Hit It, on LICENSE TO ILL (Columbia Records 1986).
116. See Robin Hoffman, Digital Sampling-Lawyers Debate the Legal Realities of an
Emerging New Art Form, BACK STAGE, Oct. 27, 1989, at 34. Additionally, the phrase "Yo'
Leroy" probably could not be copyrighted as one cannot copyright a small phrase. See supra
notes 44-51 and accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 44-51 and accompanying text.
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anywhere from 134118 to 2000.119 Although an unknown number of
musicians have sampled Brown without authorization, Brown has
successfully sued some artists who have sampled his recordings.' 20 In
addition to copyright infringement, courts may find that sampling
one of James Brown's yells is an infringement upon another one of
his rights.' 2
In addressing the second question, which dealt with extreme altera-
tions of the original copyright, the Taxe court found that the case did
not involve this particular issue; however, it intimated that such com-
prehensive alterations may be far from Congress' idea of prohibited
infringement.' 22 Both of the questions posed in Taxe frequently arise
in sampling infringement suits and, therefore, should be addressed by
the courts.
2. Quantitative v. Qualitative Use Analysis
The third statutory factor contains both quantitative and qualita-
tive elements that permit different degrees of copying in each individ-
ual case, depending upon the facts involved. The quantitative analysis
compares the percentage of the copyrighted work appropriated by the
user to the copyrighted work as a whole.12  This type of analysis is
not a very efficient means of determining whether such a use is fair
because the percentage of the copyrighted work used is not disposi-
tive by any means. Most courts simply use the quantitative analysis to
support whatever ruling they make. For example, in Maxtone-Gra-
ham v. Burtchaell, 24 the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York found a fair use where the defendant
quoted 4.3% of the plaintiff's book, which was being phased out of
publication.1 25 One year later, the same court, in Craft v. Kobler, 26
rejected a fair use defense even though the defendant quoted only 3%
118. Garcia, supra note 19, at 69.
119. Ann E. Andrews, Claim That Tune, U.S. Naws& WORLD REP., Jan. 13, 1992, at 14.
120. Id. Brown sued the makers of the film The Commitments for $3 million, claiming
unauthorized use of his music and likeness. Id. Brown's lawyer, Thomas Hart, stated that
"Brown expects payment when he is copied." Id.
121. Id.; see Allen, supra note 52, at 185.
122. Taxe, 380 F. Supp. at 1014; see infra notes 159-62 and accompanying text.
123. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (1988); Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F.
Supp. 1522, 1533-34 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)(court examined the percentage of the work copied and
determined that excerpts copied were quantitatively substantial).
124. 631 F. Supp. 1432 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 803 F.2d 1253 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481
U.S. 1059 (1987).
125. Id. at 1437-38.
126. 667 F. Supp. 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
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of the plaintiff's book. 27 Accordingly, courts rarely engage in this
type of analysis in music copyright cases. Although neither Craft nor
Maxtone-Graham are music copyright cases, their inconsistent hold-
ings aptly illustrate the futility of the quantitative analysis approach.
A qualitative analysis provides a more efficient and reliable ap-
proach to the issue. The dispositive question in this type of analysis
is, "Did the sample contain the heart of the original composition?"
The Supreme Court has stated that a taking which is "insubstantial
with respect to the infringing work" does not necessarily qualify as a
fair use.""8 Because the fair use defense has only been raised in the
music field in infringement actions involving parodies or satires, 129
the qualitative analysis has not yet been tested in a digital sampling
case. 30 Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's reservation, due to the
typical use of such samples and the brevity of the portion generally
sampled, this third factor should not weigh too heavily against a find-
ing of fair use in a sampling case.
D. The Fourth Factor: The Effect of the Use Upon the Potential
Market for or Value of the Copyrighted Work
Courts have characterized this factor as "undoubtedly the single
most important element of fair use."'' In considering this factor, the
court must weigh the benefit gained by the copyright owner when use
is deemed unfair against the benefit gained by the public when use is
deemed fair. 32 According to the Supreme Court, "[a]ctual present
harm need not be shown . . . Nor is it necessary to show with cer-
tainty that future harm will result. What is necessary is a showing by
a preponderance of the evidence that some meaningful likelihood of
future harm exists."' Further, "if the defendant's work adversely
affects the value of any of the rights in the copyrighted work ... the
use is not fair."' 34 Thus, if any of the five exclusive rights of the
copyright owner of the underlying musical composition' or any of
127. Id. at 129.
128. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 565 (1985).
129. See Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 972 F.2d 1429 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. granted
in part, 113 S. Ct. 1642 (1993).
130. The qualitative analysis allows a larger appropriation of material in the parody or
satire context than in the literary field. Compare A cuff-Rose, 972 F.2d at 1429 with Harper &
Row, 471 U.S. at 539.
131. Harper& Row. 471 U.S. at 566.
132. See Acuff-Rose, 972 F.2d at 1438.
133. Sony Corp. of Amer. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984).
134. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 568 (citation omitted)(emphasis added).
135. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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the three exclusive rights of the copyright owner of the sound
recording'3 6 are either actually or potentially adversely affected, the
use is presumptively unfair.'" Additionally, courts have interpreted
this factor to include a consideration of whether the challenged use or
practice, if widespread, would have a detrimental effect on the indus-
try as a whole. 3 Indeed, massive amounts of sampling without pay-
ment of compensation to the copyright owners would have such an
effect upon the music industry. Theoretically then, this factor will
almost always weigh against a finding of fair use in a sampling in-
fringement case.
Consistent with this analysis, the Sixth Circuit, in Acuff-Rose,
stated "[i]t is the blatantly commercial purpose of the derivative
work that prevents this parody from being a fair use."' 3 9 In a digital
sampling context, the logical implication of this decision is that if the
infringing user makes any amount of profit from the infringing sam-
ple, more than likely a court will make a per se finding against fair
use. Such an interpretation is inappropriate and entirely too stringent
for sampling infringement purposes. First, such a per se rule essen-
tially forecloses the possibility of having any unauthorized commer-
cial parodies. This runs counter to both the statute's purpose in
allowing such parodies for criticism or comment'" and the copyright
clause's intent to stimulate creativity. '14 Second, it is generally ex-
pected that a sample will be used for commercial purposes. Rarely,
however, will the user build the new composition entirely upon the
sample alone. 142 Thus, the Acuff-Rose presumption is inappropriate
in the digital sampling context.
Although courts have emphasized the importance of this fourth
fair use factor, it should be the least significant factor in a digital
sampling infringement analysis, with one small exception. ,4 This fac-
tor is insignificant because the material typically sampled is but a
small fraction of the original composition. Additionally, the sample's
use in the new composition is generally minimal. The sample is often
used only for novelty or sonic effect. Consequently, it is difficult to
136. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
137. Only if the respective copyright owner of the right infringed upon is a party to the suit
will this presumption come into effect. See supra notes 37-43 and accompanying text.
138. Sony Corp. of Amer. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984).
139. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 972 F.2d 1429, 1439 (6th Cir. 1992), cert.
granted in part, 113 S. Ct. 1642 (1993).
140. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
142. See supra note 92.
143. See infra note 148 and accompanying text.
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say that this type of limited use harms the potential market of the
original.
IV. ADDITIONAL FACTORS COURTS SHOULD CONSIDER IN DIGITAL
SAMPLING CASES
The current copyright statute simply mandates that courts weigh at
least the four factors listed.'" Additional factors more suitable for a
digital sampling analysis may include: the importance of the sampled
material, both to the original recording and the allegedly infringing
work; the frequency with which the sample is used in the allegedly
infringing work; the popularity of the original recording; alteration
of the sampled material; attempts by the user to negotiate a license
for the use of the sample with the sampled artist; and acknowledg-
ments by the user of the sampled material. Each additional factor will
be addressed herein and evaluated as to its applicability to a fair use
determination in a digital sampling infringement case. 145
A. The Importance of the Sampled Material Both to the Original
Recording and the Allegedly Infringing Work
An entire copyright infringement case may hinge upon this factor
alone. Because the copyright law exists to encourage artistic endeav-
ors and creative efforts,'" the more creative and innovative the musi-
cian is in using the sample, the less likely a court will be to find that
an infringement has occurred. 4 7 On the other hand, if the musician
uses the sample as the entire underlying composition, or as a signifi-
cant portion of it, then the musician has expended little if any creativ-
ity and the court is less likely to protect that particular use.'"8
144. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988) ("[Tlhe factors to be considered shall include .... ").
145. Many of these additional factors have been previously suggested in several sources.
See, e.g., Judith Greenberg Finell, How a Musicologist Views Digital Sampling Issues,
N.Y.L.J., May 22, 1992, at 5, 5-7; A New Spin on Music Sampling, supra note 52, at 740-42.
146. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
147. See, e.g., Runstadler Studios, Inc. v. MCM Ltd. Partnership, 768 F. Supp. 1292,
1297-98 (N.D. 11. 1991). The court in Runstadler Studios stated:
As a work embodies more in the way of particularized expression, it . . . receives
broader copyright protection .... [T]he 'strongest' works [receiving the greatest
copyright protection are those] in which fairly complex or fanciful artistic expres-
sions predominate over relatively simplistic themes and which are almost entirely
products of the author's creativity rather than concomitants of those themes.
Id. (citation omitted).
148. Rapper Vanilla Ice, who sampled a very distinctive portion of "Under Pressure," DA-
vID BowtE & QUEEN, Under Pressure, on HoT SPACE (Hollywood Records 1982), for his No. I
hit "Ice Ice Baby," VANILLA ICE, Ice Ice Baby, on To THE EXTREME (SBK Records 1990),
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Another way to evaluate this factor is to determine if the challenged
piece can stand on its own without the use of the sample. 49 If the
answer is no, then the court should weigh this against a finding of
fair use.
Determining the significance of the sampled portion to the original
copyright relates back to the previous discussion of qualitative analy-
sis under the third statutory fair use factor. 150 If the musician samples
a recognizable chorus or melody, often referred to as the "hook" of
the song, then the musician has appropriated what may be termed the
"heart" of the work. 5' If the new work relies heavily upon the sam-
pled "heart" of the original composition, this should weigh against a
finding of fair use. Accordingly, this factor, which emulates the third
statutory factor, is of primary significance in a digital sampling fair
use analysis.
B. The Frequency With Which the Sample Is Used in the Allegedly
Infringing Work
This factor mirrors the futile quantitative analysis that emanates
from the third statutory fair use factor.' Accordingly, any hard and
fast rule limiting the number of times a musician may use a sample in
a song would prove unworkable. For example, with the sample of a
snare drum, the sample may sound hundreds of times in one song,
yet its multiple use is no more infringing than if it was only used
once. 5 13 Because sampled musicians are denied the compensation
commensurate with their employment in a recording session, they
have a right to be upset.14 Consequently, sampled artists, in addition
to copyright owners, may argue that multiple use, like the single use
avoided a lawsuit by adding their names to the composer credits. Garcia, supra note 19, at 69.
Rapper Hammer followed the same route with his song "U Can't Touch This," supra note 92,
which used extensive samples of Rick James' Super Freak, supra note 88. See Garcia, supra
note 19.
149. See Finell, supra note 145, at 5.
150. See supra notes 44-51 and accompanying text.
151. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 972 F.2d 1429, 1438 (6th Cir. 1992), cert.
granted in part, 113 S.Ct. 1642(1993).
152. See supra notes 123-27 and accompanying text.
153. See Johnson, supra note 5, at 282 ("Before digital sampling, a one-note recording had
no commercial value. Today, single-note and few-note sound recordings do have commercial
value."); see id. at 292 ("Distinctive sounds repeated throughout a sound recording may be-
come timbral 'hooks' analogous to the musical hooks in popular music.").
154. See Pareles, supra note 1, at C23.
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of one long sample,'5 5 significantly infringes upon the sampled work.
Musicians' arguments for giving more consideration to this inquiry,
however, will prove unavailing. As no general rule can be established
allowing for adequate examination of this factor, its contribution to
infringement analysis is minimal.
C. The Popularity of the Original Recording
Copyright law treats all copyrights the same, regardless of popular-
ity.16 Theoretically then, the amount of commercial success enjoyed
by a copyright will not be relevant in an infringement analysis. Never-
theless, if a musician samples a copyright owner's only commercial
"hit," as was the case in Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner Bros.
Records,5 7 the court may be prone to sympathize with the copyright
owner and, as a result, give the original recording slightly more pro-
tection. Further, if the sampled copyright is part of an out-of-print,
obscure composition, this fact may influence the court, either con-
sciously or subconsciously, to make a finding of fair use.' There-
fore, although the popularity of the original work should not be a
significant factor in this analysis, it may directly or indirectly influ-
ence the court's decision.
D. Alteration of the Sampled Material
The greater the 'amount of alterations to the original, the more
likely this factor will support a finding of fair use. For example,
courts may be more likely to find fair use where the alterations to a
155. See Grand Upright Music, Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, 780 F.2d 182 (S.D.N.Y.
1991); see also infra notes 156-62 and accompanying text.
156. Section 102 states: "Copyright protection subsists . . . in original works of authorship
fixed in any tangible medium of expression .... " 17 U.S.C. §102 (1988). The statute does not
base the degree of protection given a copyright upon either the amount of success or the artistic
merit of a work. See, e.g., Trifari, Krussman & Fishel, Inc. v. Chard Co., 134 F. Supp. 551,
552 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) ("The relative artistic merit of a work is not material in determining eligi-
bility for copyright.") (decided under section 5 of the 1909 Copyright Act (section 102 of the
1976 Copyright Act)); Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852 (5th
Cir. 1979) (immoral works are afforded copyright protection), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 917
(1980); see also HomerLaughlin China Co. v. Oman, 1991 WL 154540 at *3 (D.D.C. 1991). In
HomerLaughlin China Co., the court, relying on the Supreme Court's rejection of the "sweat
of the brow" doctrine in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service, Inc., I I S. Ct.
1282 (1991), rejected plaintiff's argument that the work's commercial success, professional
skills, and artistic recognition qualify it for copyright protection. Id. The court stated that
"Feist . . . and the 1976 revisions to the Copyright Act leave no doubt that originality, not
'sweat of the brow' is the touchstone of copyright protection . Id. (quoting Feist, 111 S.
Ct. at 1295).
157. 780 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); see infra notes 164-86 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
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particular piece make the original recording unrecognizable. If the
musician simply altered the tempo of the sample, however, the
court's finding of infringement might depend upon how drastic the
tempo change actually is. A slight tempo change would tend to weigh
against a finding of fair use because the sampled composition would
probably remain recognizable. Conversely, an extreme tempo change
would tend to mask the original recording and make it unrecogniza-
ble, thereby favoring a finding of fair use.5 9
If the musician simply transposes the original work by electroni-
cally changing the key, then the musician has only minimally altered
the original work. Such minimal alterations would weigh against a
finding of fair use.lw If the musician played the sample backwards,
however, the general public would probably not recognize the origi-
nal copyrighted work. Consequently, no claim of infringement could
be successfully asserted. If the musician digitally rearranged the sam-
ple, an infringement suit might lie depending upon the result of the
rearrangement. For example, if the sampled portion was a vocal line
saying "All I want is you, love," and the sampler rearranges the
words to say "I love you all," dropping the words "want" and "is,"
it is unlikely that an infringement action would lie. Thus, depending
upon the amount and type of alteration, verbatim sampling may or
may not qualify as an infringement.
Additionally, the copyright statute provides that sound recording
copyright owners have the exclusive right "to prepare a derivative
work 16' in which the actual sounds fixed in the sound recording are
rearranged, remixed, or otherwise altered in sequence or quality."' 62
This may pose a problem for rap artists, as their samples do use the
actual sounds from the sound recording. Additionally, rap artists re-
arrange, remix, or otherwise alter in sequence or in quality the actual
sounds in the sound recording. Thus, they may infringe upon the
sound recording copyright owner's exclusive right to prepare a deriv-
ative work. Accordingly, alteration of the sample may help, as well as
hinder, the alleged infringer's defense.
159. See Finell, supra note 145, at 5. When the rap group De la Soul sampled a portion of
the Turtles' song "You Showed Me," supra note 15, electronically slowed the tempo, and used
it for their song "Transmitting Live From Mars," supra note 15, they were faced with a $1.7
million lawsuit. See Flanders, supra note 15, at 668.
160. Finell, supra note 145, at 5; see also, Robin Givhan, The Next Sound You Hear, DET.
FREa PRESS, Feb. 4, 1990, at 6.
161. Section 101 defines a derivative work as "a work based upon one or more preexisting
works, such as a . . .musical arrangement, ... [or] sound recording . 17 U.S.C. § 101
(1988).
162. Id. § 114(b) (emphasis added).
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E. Attempts by the User to Negotiate a License With the Sampled
Artist for the Use of a Sample
This factor tends to demonstrate the sampling artist's good faith
and fair dealing and would only prove significant in a case where the
musician could not locate the copyright owner. 63 As a result of the
United States' adherence to the Berne Convention,'" a sampling art-
ist might have difficulty locating the copyright owner, as registration
of the copyright is not required for protection.161 If a copyright owner
is found and consequently denies an artist's request for permission to
use a sample of the copyright, then any use of that work will more
than likely constitute an infringement. Accordingly, as fair use is
partly based on good faith and fair dealing,166 a sampling artist who
has been denied permission in writing to use a sample could probably
not assert a fair use defense.
F. The User's Acknowledgment of the Owners of the Sampled
Material
This factor, like the previous factor, may indicate good faith on
the part of the musician using the sample. If the sampling artist could
not locate the copyright owner, but knows who the owner is and gives
the owner credit in the liner notes,'167 the artist's good faith efforts
may subtly influence the court's decision. An acknowledgment may
reduce the amount of damages or support an estoppel argument
163. Cf. Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, 780 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y.
1991); see infra notes 178-83 and accompanying text. In Grand Upright, defendant rapper was
enjoined from distributing an album containing a sample of plaintiff's copyright as plaintiff
denied permission for its use. 780 F. Supp. at 182. The district court found the defendant's
request-for-consent letter, which had been sent to the plaintiff and subsequently denied, the
most persuasive evidence in the case. Id.
164. The United States became a member of the Berne Convention in 1987. It amended its
copyright laws to conform with the Berne Convention effective March 1, 1989. Berne Conven-
tion Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (Oct. 31, 1988) (effec-
tive March 1, 1989). As a result, United States' copyrights now enjoy protection in any country
that is a member of the Convention. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works (Paris Text, 1971), art. I.
165. As a part of this amendment to the Berne Convention, copyright registration is no
longer a prerequisite for copyright protection. 17 U.S.C. § 408(a) (1988). If the copyright no-
tice is absent from distributed copies of the work or if the copyright has not been registered
with the Register of Copyrights, then the copyright owner is denied statutory damages or attor-
ney's fees. Id. § 412. Alternatively, if the copyright notice is present on copies distributed and
the copyright is registered with the Copyright Office, then the innocent infringement defense is
precluded and the plaintiff may prove actual damages. Id.
166. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985) ("Fair use
presupposes 'good faith' and 'fair dealing."' (citation omitted)).
167. Liner notes consist of the credits listed on the album jacket or the inside of the cassette
or compact disc jewel box.
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against a copyright owner who asserts that he or she had no notice
but who also willfully concealed his or her identity.'6 8 Thus, while not
completely absolving the sampling artist from liability, an acknow-
ledgment cannot hinder a fair use defense.
V. IMPLICATIONS OF RECENT COURT DECISIONS
Until recently, no court had addressed the sampling issue. In 1991,
however, Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc. 16 9
came before the United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York. The plaintiff, Raymond "Gilbert" O'Sullivan, sought
a preliminary injunction prohibiting rap artist Biz Markie, his record
label (Warner Brothers), and his music publishing company (Cold
Chillin' Records) from distributing Biz Markie's album entitled I
Need A Haircut, 70 which contained the song "Alone Again."'' In
1972, O'Sullivan had composed and recorded the song "Alone Again
(Naturally) ' 1 7 2 which turned out to be his biggest, and only, hit.1 73
Biz Markie's version sampled twenty seconds, the first eight bars, of
O'Sullivan's original recording, "looped' '1 74 it, and used it as the un-
derlying music of his song.' 7" Biz Markie then added a drum track
and his vocals on top of the sample and used O'Sullivan's lyrical re-
frain, consisting of the words "alone again, naturally.' ' 7 6
Before the release of the album, the attorney for Biz Markie sent a
letter and a copy of the song to O'Sullivan's agent. 77 The letter ex-
plained that Biz Markie's song incorporated parts of O'Sullivan's
song and asked for O'Sullivan's consent in using the samples. 17 Cold
Chillin' Records, however, released the album before receiving final
clearance from O'Sullivan to use the samples. 79 Thereafter, O'Sulli-
168. Although an estoppel argument and a good faith attempt at locating the copyright
owner may be possible legal strategies, no cases to date have been defended on these grounds.
169. 780 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
170. Biz MARKiE, supra note 92.
171. Grand Upright, 780 F. Supp. at 183.
172. GILBERT O'SULLIVAN, supra note 92.
173. Grand Upright, 780 F. Supp. at 183; see also Sugarman & Salvo, supra note 50, at 34.
174. To "loop" a sample, one directs it to automatically return to the beginning of the
sample when it reaches the end. Thus, the sample continues to be heard for as long as a key is
depressed.
175. Philips, supra note 2, at Fl.
176. Sugarman & Salvo, supra note 50, at 34.
177. Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, 780 F. Supp. 182, 184 (S.D.N.Y.
1991).
178. Id.
179. Sugarman & Salvo, supra note 50, at 34.
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van refused to give his permission to use the sample and demanded
that the record company remove the album from the market. 80
When District Judge Duffy began his opinion with the quote
"Thou shalt not steal,"'' the defendants knew they were in for a
rough ride. Whether O'Sullivan actually owned the copyright and the
master sound recording of the original song served as the only dis-
puted issue.8 2 The court found the request-for-consent letter the most
persuasive evidence in this case. " The court discussed neither the fair
use defense nor the innumerable copyright issues and subtleties impli-
cated by sampling. These issues were not discussed due to Biz Mar-
kie's exclusive reliance upon the relatively long sample of a section of
O'Sullivan's song, which definitely hindered any de minimis or fair
use defense that he might have raised.8 4 The court did, however, evi-
dence its hostility toward unauthorized sampling. Judge Duffy, so in-
censed at this violation of the copyright laws, referred this matter to
the United States Attorney for possible criminal prosecution. 85 The
dispute was ultimately settled out of court for an undisclosed, but
"substantial," payment. 186
Despite its subject matter, this case sheds little, if any, light upon
the subject of sampling infringement. Nor does it provide guidance to
musicians seeking to use samples in their work. Indeed, this decision
may discourage artists from sending written consent requests to copy-
right owners, as these requests might serve as "smoking guns" rather
than safety measures. If an artist should decide to release an album
containing the samples regardless of the response, or lack of re-
sponse, received from a copyright owner with regard to consent, the
letter may constitute evidence of willful infringement. 87
180. Grand Upright, 780 F. Supp. at 184.
181. Id. at 183 (quoting Exodus 20:15).
182. Id. The district ourt found that O'Sullivan did own both copyrights notwithstanding
some minor irregularities in their registration. id. at 185.
183. Id. at 184. Judge Duffy stated: "In writing this letter, counsel for Biz Markie admit-
tedly was seeking 'terms' for the use of the material. One would not agree to pay to use the
material of another unless there was a valid copyright! What more persuasive evidence can
there be!" Id.
184. Robert G. Sugarman & Joseph P. Salvo, Sampling Litigation in the Limelight,
N.Y.L.J., Mar. 16, 1992, at 1. The pleadings and supporting documents did not seriously argue
either defense, The defendants argued that because "Alone Again," supra note 92, was only
one of thirteen cuts on the album and was not set to be released as a single or otherwise, that
the use was de minimis. Id.
185. Grand Upright, 780 F. Supp. at 185.
186. Philips, supra note 2, at Fl.
187. Sugarman & Salvo, supra note 50, at 34; see also Harrington, supra note 4, at D7.
Monica Lynch, president of Tommy Boy Records, said the Grand Upright decision "won't
discourage people from sampling or even make the rates go up, but it will make labels, artists
and producers a lot more cautious about making sure their t's are crossed and their i's are
dotted before they put music out in the marketplace." Id.
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The unique facts of Grand Upright narrowly limit its holding.
Here, one person owned both the copyright in the underlying compo-
sition and the copyright in the master recording, a relatively rare phe-
nomenon."' In the typical situation, a record company will own the
master recording rights and a music publisher will own the rights in
the underlying composition.8 9 These entities are usually more amena-
ble to licensing the use of samples than individual artists such as
O'Sullivan. 190
Another case indirectly addressing the sampling issue is Acuff-Rose
Music, Inc. v. Campbell.191 As stated earlier, 192 Acuff-Rose addressed
the interaction between parody and the fair use defense. While the
majority quickly passed over the sampling issue because it was not
raised, the dissent provided some hint as to what courts might do
when faced directly with the digital sampling issue. 93 In his dissent,
Circuit Judge Nelson stated that 'sampling' of no more than a few
notes should be governed by the maxim de minimis non curat lex [the
law does not concern itself with trifles]." 194 Therefore, even in the
Sixth Circuit, where music lobbyists carry great weight, 95 some hope
exists for a fair use defense to a sampling infringement suit. With the
Supreme Court's grant of certiorari in this case,' 96 some light may
soon be shed upon the sampling issue.
VI. CONCLUSION
As a result of actual, as well as threatened, litigation in the area of
digital sampling infringement, several developments have occurred.
Sampling clearinghouses serve as one recent outgrowth. 197 These com-
panies are similar to publisher clearinghouses in that they are author-
ized by member copyright owners to clear samples for use on albums
according to an agreed upon fee structure. In addition, record com-
panies and most music publishers have instituted certain licensing
policies as more and more artists routinely seek clearance for their
samples with the hope of avoiding litigation. 9 These developments
188, Sugarman & Salvo, supra note 184, at 1.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. 972 F.2d 1429(6th Cir. 1992), cert. granted in part, 113 S. Ct. 1642 (1993).
192. See supra note 90.
193. Acuff-Rose, 972 F.2d at 1444 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
194. Id. at 1444 n.5.
195. One seat of the Sixth Circuit is located in Nashville, Tennessee.
196. 113 S. Ct. 1642 (1993).
197. See John Leland, The Moper vs. the Rapper, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 6, 1992, at 55.
198. See Goldberg & Bernstein, supra note 2, at 31.
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will help ease the tension between those who sample and those who
are sampled.
Another beneficial development is a sliding fee scale arrangement.
Under such an agreement, those who want to use a sample would pay
a small royalty (a few cents or less) upon the sale of each album that
contains that sample.'9 This system conforms to today's standard
royalty payment scheme for songwriters and artists.20 Many other li-
censing alternatives for samples already exist, such as the grant of a
mechanical licens&0' for a flat one-time fee, the grant of a mechanical
license for a royalty plus a percentage of the performance royalties
generated by the new composition, or the seeking of co-ownership of
the new song. 0 2 Admirably, the music industry is heading in the di-
rection of pro forma licensing of samples before they are used in any
new composition .203
Notwithstanding the music industry's current direction toward such
licensing practices, fair use should remain a viable defense. The
courts should not completely bar its assertion simply because the
sample is of an original sound recording. The copyright clause, which
was established to encourage creativity, supports this contention. Al-
though the fair use defense initially only applied to literary works, it
can be successfully applied to digital sampling as well. To this end,
courts must refrain from limiting their analysis to the four factors
enumerated in the statute. The additional factors listed in this Com-
ment, combined with the transformative/productive use analysis, will
provide a more efficient determination of whether the challenged use
of the sample is a fair one.
As technology progresses, so should the analysis under the copy-
right statute. The courts can no longer simply rely on examination
techniques or presumptions that are outdated and inappropriate in
199. See John Horn, Rap Stars' "Sampling" Is Stealing to Some, S.F. CtRON., May 18,
1989, at E2.
200. See generally 17 U.S.C. §§ 115(c) (compulsory license royalty payment scheme); 116(b)
(compulsory license royalty payment scheme for coin-operated phonorecord players) (1988).
201. A mechanical license is a license that authorizes one to make reproductions of a musi-
cal composition for distributing them to the public for private use. See AL KOHN & BOB KOHN,
THE ART OF Music LICENsrNo 307 (1992).
202. For a thorough discussion of sample licensing and clearing practices, see KoHNsc &
KOHN, supra note 201, at 816-27.
203. See Goldberg & Bernstein, supra note 2, at 31.
Over the past year, every major and most minor record and music publishing compa-
nies have instituted policies and procedures for handling sampling clearances. Com-
panies are now fully equipped to handle sampling requests, and artists are aware that
they may have to make the requests. Most musicians and copyright owners in the
music community are ready to give credit where credit is due.
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the context of this new digital technology. Rather, the courts should
apply a contemporary analysis, one that includes consideration of the
additional factors described here. Such an analysis, coupled with the
music industry's push toward more reasonable licensing procedures,
will better serve copyright owners by protecting their legal rights, as
well as musicians by protecting against economic stifling of their cre-
ativity.

